We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal with imperfect commitment power to a better informed but biased agent. We consider a variant of a cheap talk game ala Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which the principal can promise to rubberstamp certain recommendations and agents can impose a cost on her if she reneges on her promise. This cost represents the cost of con ‡ict in a repeated relationship and captures the principal's commitment power. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for any commitment power and show that they resemble organizational arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation is optimal for almost all distributions. Outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal's commitment power is su¢ ciently small.
Introduction
The internal allocation of decision rights is a key determinant of the behavior of …rms. While owners have the formal authority to make all decisions on behalf of their …rms, they typically delegate at least some important decision rights to their employees. These employees, however, often have consistent biases and can be expected to make di¤erent decisions than the owners would (Jensen 1986 ). An understanding of what determines the internal allocation of decision rights is therefore a prerequisite for understanding, and potentially being able to predict, the decisions that …rms make, such as how much to invest and how many workers to hire and …re. In this paper we investigate the optimal allocation of decision rights within …rms. In particular, we investigate how the owner of a …rm should delegate decision rights to a biased employee.
While the formal authority to make decisions is concentrated at the top of …rms, the information needed to make e¤ective use of this authority is often dispersed throughout their ranks. The legal right to decide on the allocation of capital, for instance, resides with the owners of …rms but CEOs, division managers, and other employees are often better informed about the pro…tability of di¤erent investment projects. The bene…t of delegating decision rights is that it allows the owners to utilize the speci…c knowledge that their employees might have (Holmström 1977 (Holmström , 1984 Jensen and Meckling 1992 ).
There are two main di¢ culties in delegating decision rights, however. First, as mentioned above, there is ample evidence which suggests that employees have consistent biases and are therefore likely to make di¤erent decisions than the owners would want them to. Agency costs therefore place a limit on the ability of owners to delegate decision rights (Holmström 1977 (Holmström , 1984 Jensen and Meckling 1992) . Second, delegated decision rights are always "loaned, not owned"(Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999, p.56). In other words, while owners can delegate decision rights ex ante they can always overrule the decisions that employees make ex post.
Anticipating the possibility of being overruled the employees in turn may act strategically and, as a result, their speci…c knowledge might not get used e¢ ciently. Imperfect commitment therefore places a second limit on the ability of owners to delegate decision rights (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).
Due to the presence of agency costs and the lack of perfect commitment owners rarely engage in complete delegation, that is they rarely delegate decision rights without putting in place rules and regulations that constrain the decisions their employees can make. Consider, for instance, the decision over the allocation of capital which is often delegated to lower level managers and, in particular, to division managers. While in some …rms these division managers have almost full discretion in deciding between di¤erent investment projects, in most they face a variety of constraints. In some …rms, for instance, division managers are allowed to decide on investment projects that a¤ect the daily operation of their divisions but not on those that are deemed to a¤ect the future of the …rm as a whole. In other …rms division managers can decide on investment projects that do not exceed a certain threshold size and their superiors decide on larger projects. 1 In this paper we show that many of the organizational arrangements that we observe in practice arise optimally in a model in which a principal with imperfect commitment delegates decision rights to a better informed but biased agent.
Our analysis is based on a model with three main features: (i.) a …rm that consists of a principal and an agent has to implement a project and the principal has the formal authority to decide which project is implemented. The potential projects di¤er on one dimension, for instance investment size, and the principal and the agents have di¤erent preferences over this dimension. (ii.) the agent is better informed about the projects'payo¤s than the principal. In particular, only the agent observes the state of the world which determines the identity of his preferred project and that of the principal. Before making her decision the principal asks the agent for a recommendation. The principal then either rubberstamps the recommendation or overrules it and implements another project. (iii.) the principal has some commitment power.
In particular, before the agent makes his recommendation, the principal makes a promise about how she will respond to the agent's recommendation. In case the principal reneges on this promise, for instance by not rubberstamping a recommendation that she promised to approve, she incurs a certain cost. This cost measures the principal's commitment power: the higher the cost, the more commitment power the principal has. We interpret this cost as the damage that an agent can impose on the principal through unproductive behavior in a repeated relationship. We …rst follow MacLeod (2003) in considering a static model in which the cost of con ‡ict is exogenous and then develop a repeated game in which this cost is endogenously determined.
Although the principal always has the formal authority to decide on the projects, she can engage in many di¤erent types of relational delegation. In other words, she can implicitly commit to many di¤erent decision rules that map the agent's recommendations into decisions.
For instance, she can engage in complete delegation by committing herself to always rubberstamp the agent's recommendation. Other possibilities include threshold delegation -in which case the principal rubberstamps the agent's recommendation up to a certain size and implements her preferred project if he recommends a project that is above the threshold -and menu delegation -in which case the principal rubberstamps the agent's recommendation only if he proposes one of a …nite number of projects. Of course the principal can also choose to ignore the agent's recommendation altogether and simply implement the project that maximizes her expected payo¤ given her prior. In other words, she can engage in centralization.
Should the principal centralize or delegate? And if she delegates, should she engage in complete delegation, threshold delegation, or some other form of delegation? The key tradeo¤ that the principal faces when she considers the many di¤erent organizational arrangements is between the direct cost of biasing her decisions in favor of the agent and the indirect bene…t of inducing the agent to reveal more information. Moreover, when optimizing this trade-o¤ the principal must keep in mind that the extent to which she is able to bias her decisions is limited by her potentially imperfect commitment power. We show that in many cases the organizational arrangements that the principal chooses in our setting are commonly observed in the real world. In particular, we show that centralization, threshold delegation and menu delegation are often optimal and that which one of these arrangements is optimal depends only on the principal's commitment power, on the one hand, and a simple condition on the agents' bias and the distribution of the state space, on the other. Moreover, we show that for small biases threshold delegation is optimal for almost all distributions. These results are consistent with the pervasive use of threshold delegation in organizations. Having derived our main characterization result we then investigate further implications, including the e¤ects of changes in the bias and the amount of private information on the optimal organizational arrangement.
We also show that irrespective of the commitment power of the principal complete delegation is never optimal and that outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal's commitment power is su¢ ciently small. Finally, we discuss empirical implications of our analysis.
In the next section we discuss the related literature. In Section 3 we then present our basic model in which the principal's commitment power is exogenously given. We analyze this model in Sections 4 and 5 and characterize the optimal organizational arrangements for any given level of commitment. In Section 6 we then embed our basic model in a repeated game in which the principal's commitment power is endogenously determined. There we show that the optimal relational contract corresponds to optimal organizational arrangements in the static model for an appropriately speci…ed discount rate. The repeated game allows us to derive additional implications which we discuss in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Related Literature
Suppose an organization, consisting of a principal and an agent, has to make a decision. The principal and the agent have di¤erent preferences over the decision and only the agent observes the state of the world which determines the principal's and the agent's preferred projects. A large number of papers have analyzed this basic problem and they can be categorized in two dimensions: (i.) whether or not they allow for transfers between the principal and the agent and (ii.) the extent of the principal's commitment power.
Our paper contributes to the strand of the literature which argues that in many environments transfers between the principal and the agent are di¢ cult or impossible. Within this strand of the literature one can distinguish between delegation-and cheap talk models. In the cheap talk models that follow Crawford and Sobel (1982) principals cannot commit to arbitrary decision rules, that is they cannot commit to act on the information they receive in a pre-speci…ed way. In contrast, in the delegation models that follow Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 the principal can commit to a decision rule. Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 considers a general version of the set up described above and proves the existence of an optimal delegation set or, equivalently, an optimal decision rule. He then characterizes optimal interval delegation sets, i.e. delegation sets in which the agent can choose any decision from a speci…c interval. 2 Arm- 2 For a speci…c example he shows that interval delegation is optimal among all compact delegation sets strong (1995) considers a model similar to Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 and allows for uncertainty over the agent's preferences. Like Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 he focuses on interval delegation.
In a setting in which the players'preferred decisions are linear functions of the state and the state is uniformly distributed, Melumad and Shibano (1991) characterize the optimum among all compact delegation sets. In a recent paper Alonso and Matouschek (2005) also solve for the optimal delegation set in a setting that allows for more general distributions and for arbitrary continuous state-dependent biases. Martimort and Semenov (2005) consider a setting with multiple agents and provide a su¢ cient condition for threshold delegation to be optimal.
Since we allow for di¤erent degrees of commitment by the principal, varying from no commitment all the way to perfect commitment, our paper bridges the cheap talk and delegation literatures. Instead of making assumptions about what the principal can and cannot commit to, we endogenize her commitment power and characterize the optimal decision rule for any amount of commitment power.
The second strand of the literature that analyzes the principal-agent problem described above does allow for transfers. Ottaviani (2000) and Krishna and Morgan (2004) , in particular, both allow for message-contingent transfers but make di¤erent assumption about the principal's commitment power. In particular, Krishna and Morgan (2004) focus on the case in which the principal can only commit to a transfer rule while Ottaviani (2000) allows the principal to commit to a transfer-and a decision rule.
Finally, our work is related to several recent papers that investigate the role of relational contracts within and between organizations. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 2002) investigate the use of objective and subjective performance measures and the ownership structures of …rms in a repeated setting. Levin (2003) investigates relational incentive contracts in the presence of moral hazard and asymmetric information. MacLeod (2003) extends Levin (2003) to the case of a risk averse agent. We …rst follow MacLeod (2003) in treating the cost of con‡ict as exogenous and then follow the previous papers by endogenizing them in an in…nitely repeated game. (Holmström 1977; p.44 ).
The Model with Exogenous Commitment
A …rm needs to implement a project. A principal has the formal authority to decide what project is chosen but she needs to hire an agent to implement it.
Preferences: The projects are represented by a positive real number y 2 Y R + . Although one can interpret y as measuring any one dimension on which the projects di¤er -for instance the number of workers to be hired for a new plant or the size of a new o¢ ce building -we interpret it as the …nancial size of an investment. This interpretation facilitates the exposition and allows us to relate our …ndings to a number of papers that describe the capital budgeting rules which …rms use to regulate the internal allocation of capital. 3 The principal and the agent have di¤erent preferences over the project. In particular, the principal's payo¤ from implementing project y is U P (y; ) = (y ) 2 , where 2 = [0; 1] is the state of the world. In contrast, the agent's payo¤ is U A (y; ; b) = (y b) 2 , where the parameter b > 0 measures the congruence of the agent's and the principal's preferences. Given these preferences, the principal's preferred project is given by and the agent's is given by ( + b).
There is ample anecdotal evidence that documents the tendency of many managers to engage in empire building, i.e. to invest more than would be optimal from the perspective of their principals (see for instance Jensen 1986 ). For this reason we assume b > 0 so that the agent prefers a larger investment than the principal. The analysis can easily be adapted, however, to allow for negative biases. Since we are interpreting y as the …nancial size of an investment and since the agent's and the principal's preferred project sizes are increasing in the state , it is natural to think of low realizations of as bad states in which the business environment is unfavorable to new investments and large realizations of as good states in which the business environment is more favorable.
Information:
The agent learns the realization of the state but the principal does not. It is commonly known, however, that is drawn from a cumulative distribution function F ( ). The corresponding probability density function f ( ) is absolutely continuous and strictly positive for all 2 .
Contracts and Communication:
The principal has the legal right to decide on the projects.
We adopt the incomplete contracting approach in assuming that projects cannot be contracted upon. The principal can therefore not rely on court-enforced contracts as a commitment device. We do, however, assume that the agent is able to impose a cost on the principal if she reneges on a promise. This cost can be interpreted as the damage that an agent can impose on the principal by engaging in unproductive behavior in a repeated relationship. In our basic model we take this cost as exogenous but we endogenize it in Section 6. We follow the delegation literature in ruling out monetary transfers between the principal and the agent. The principal's payo¤ is then U P (y 0 ; ) q 2 while the agent's is U A (y 0 ; ; b). The parameter q 0 measures the principal's commitment power.
The Cheap Talk Benchmark
We start the analysis by considering the cheap talk benchmark in which the principal does not have any commitment power, i.e. q = 0. ii.
iv. a i = Thus, when lies in an interval (a i 1 ; a i ) ; the agent recommends project b y i , the principal's preferred project conditional on the state being in that interval. Given her updated beliefs, it is then optimal for the principal to rubberstamp the agent's recommendation. If the agent recommends a project that lies in an interval (a i 1 ; a i ) but is not equal to the principal's preferred project b y i , then the principal believes that is distributed on (a i 1 ; a i ) according to part
iii. of the proposition. Given these o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs, it is then optimal for the principal to reject the agent's recommendation and implement b y i instead. The dividing point a i between the partitions is derived from the indi¤erence condition
which ensures that in state a i the agent is indi¤erent between projects b y i and b y i+1 . As an example, suppose that is uniformly distributed. It then follows from part iv. of the proposition that
The lengths of the intervals therefore increase by 4b > 0 as i increases. Thus, less information gets communicated by the agent, the larger his recommendation. 4 Crawford and Sobel (1982) provide su¢ cient conditions under which the expected payo¤s of the principal and the agent are increasing in the number of intervals N . When these conditions are satis…ed, as they are in our speci…cation, one may therefore expect the players to coordinate on the equilibrium in which the number of intervals is maximized, i.e. in which
. We denote this equilibrium by ( CS ; y CS ; g CS ) and the corresponding payo¤s by U CS A and U CS P , where the superscript 'CS'stands for 'Crawford and Sobel.' In this paper we interpret interval equilibria of the type described in the …rst proposition as a form of 'menu delegation,'as de…ned next. DEFINITION 1 (Menu Delegation). Under 'menu delegation' the principal o¤ ers a menu with a …nite number of projects and rubberstamps any project on the menu. If the agent recommends a project that is not on the menu, the principal overrules him and implements one of the projects that is on the menu.
Under menu delegation, therefore, the agent can choose between a …nite number of projects. 4 The speci…cation of the communication equilibria in Proposition 1 is economically equivalent to the one in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . There is, however, a technical di¤erence between their speci…cation and ours: in their speci…cation an agent who observes 2 (ai 1; ai) sends a message that is uniformly distributed on (ai 1; ai). All possible messages M = [0; 1] are therefore used with positive probability so that o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs do not need to be speci…ed. In contrast, we need to specify o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs since we assume that an agent who observes 2 (ai 1; ai) sends a single message (see, for instance, Gibbons 1992, pp.216-217). We adopt our speci…cation solely for expositional convenience.
Delegation with Exogenous Commitment
Suppose now that the principal does have some commitment power, i.e. that q > 0. Suppose further that she has promised to use a speci…c decision rule y(m). For this promise to be credible, it must be the case that her expected payo¤ from keeping the promise is always more than her expected payo¤ from reneging and implementing b y(m) arg max E [U P (y; ) j m].
Thus, it must be that
where the equality is due to the quadratic loss function. The optimal delegation scheme (y (m; q); ( ; q)) that maximizes the principal's expected payo¤ therefore solves
subject to the agent's incentive compatibility constraint
and the reneging constraint
The characterization of the optimal delegation scheme is greatly facilitated by the fact that it has to be monotonic.
DEFINITION 2 (Monotonicity).
A delegation scheme (y(m); ( )) is monotonic if, for any two states 0 and 00 > 0 , the chosen projects satisfy y 00 y 0 .
The fact that the optimal delegation scheme is monotonic is shown in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 2 (Monotonicity).
Every optimal delegation scheme is monotonic.
The characteristics of the optimal delegation scheme depend critically on whether the principal can credibly commit to implement the agent's preferred project. Suppose that the principal knows the state and has promised to implement the agent's preferred project. This promise is only credible if the punishment for reneging, q 2 , is more than the bene…t b 2 of implementing the principal's preferred project rather than that of the agent. Whether or not the principal can credibly commit to implement the agents's preferred project therefore depends on whether the commitment power q is bigger or smaller than the agent's bias b.
In the next sub-section we characterize the optimal delegation scheme for high commitment power, i.e. for q b; and in the subsequent sub-section we characterize it for low commitment power q < b.
High Commitment Power
In this subsection we show that when the principal's commitment power is high, i.e. q b,
then the solution to the contracting problem (3) - (5) often resembles commonly observed organizational arrangements. In particular, we show that the optimal delegation scheme can take the form of either centralization or threshold delegation, as de…ned next. To understand these de…nitions, recall that we say that the principal 'rubberstamps' the agents recommendation if, in response to receiving a message m = y, she implements project y. Given this decision making by the principal, it is optimal for the agent to always recommend
The agent's information is therefore not used under this delegation scheme.
DEFINITION 4 (Threshold Delegation).
Under threshold delegation the principal rubberstamps any recommendation below a threshold project (a 1 + b) and she overrules the agent and implements (a 1 + b) if he recommends a project above the threshold.
A graphical illustration of threshold delegation is given in Figure 1 The next proposition shows that in many cases threshold delegation is in fact the optimal delegation scheme.
PROPOSITION 3 (Threshold Delegation). Suppose that q b and that
is strictly increasing in for all 2 . Then threshold delegation is optimal.
The distributional assumption stated in the proposition is satis…ed for a large number of distributions and a wide range of biases. For instance, for any distribution that has a continuously di¤erentiable density there exists a b 0 > 0 such that the condition is satis…ed for all b b 0 . Thus, it is satis…ed for most common distributions when the bias is small.
To get an intuition for why, among the very many possible delegation schemes, threshold delegation often does best for the principal, we …rst need to think about the trade-o¤ that she faces when deciding what projects to implement. The key question for the principal is how much she should bias her decision-making in favor of the agent. On the one hand, the principal clearly incurs a direct cost when she biases her decisions in favor of the agent. On the other hand, however, the agent is more willing to give precise recommendations, the more he expects his interests to be taken into account by the principal. Thus, the key trade-o¤ that the principal faces is between the direct cost of biased decision making and the indirect bene…t of better information. A feature of threshold delegation is that, conditional on the information the principal receives, decision making is biased entirely in favor of the agent when the state is below the threshold a 1 and it is not biased at all when the state is above the threshold. To see this, note that when the principal receives a recommendation m = a 1 she knows exactly the state but instead of using this information to implement her preferred project she uses it to implement the agent's preferred project ( + b). In contrast, when the principal gets a recommendation m = > a 1 , she does not know the exact state and only knows that it is above the threshold. In this case it is optimal for her to implement the project E( j a 1 )
that maximizes her expected payo¤ and not bias the decision at all in favor of the agent. As a result of this decision rule, the agent is willing to communicate all information when the state is below the threshold and very limited information when it is above the threshold.
To get an intuition for Proposition 3 it is therefore key to understand why it is optimal to bias the decisions entirely in favor of the agent in low states and not at all in high states.
For this purpose, it is instructive to compare threshold delegation to two benchmarks. In the …rst benchmark the principal always implements her preferred projects and in the second she always implements the agent's preferred project.
When the principal always implements her preferred project, the agent is not willing to A. On the other hand, precisely because she is implementing a project that is worse for her when is small, she is able to implement a project that is better for her when is large. In the example in Figure 2b this is the case when 2 [a 1 ; 2a 1 ] and the corresponding gain is indicated by triangle B. Essentially, biasing her decision in favor of the agent for low states relaxes the incentive constraint for higher states which in turn allows the principal to implement projects that are better for her. As long as the probability of being in the loss making interval [0;
is not too large compared to the probability of being in pro…ting interval [a 1 ; 2a 1 ], the gain of biasing the decision in favor of the agent outweighs the costs and the principal is made better o¤. The condition that G( ) is always increasing ensures that this is indeed the case. 5 The assumption that b y1 = b is not important and only facilitates the exposition.
To get a more formal intuition for the condition G 0 ( ) > 0, consider 
Taking derivatives gives d (a 1 ; 0) =dt = 0 and
Thus, if G( ) is always increasing, then (a 1 ; t) is convex in t. Since (a 1 ; 0) = d (a 1 ; 0) =dt = 0 this implies that if G( ) is increasing, then (a 1 ; t) > 0 for all t > 0 and, in particular, for t = a 1 .
In the second benchmark, the principal biases her decision entirely in favor of the agent who in turn always reveals the state. This case is illustrated in Figure 3a . While this arrangement allows the principal to elicit all available information, it also commits her to implement projects y > 1 that cannot be optimal for her in any state. This suggests an alternative arrangement in which the principal implements the agent's preferred project below a threshold a 1 1 and implements a single project (a 1 + b) above the threshold, as illustrated in Figure 3b . If a 1 is su¢ ciently high the principal is made better o¤ under the alternative scheme since she can realize the bene…t of less biased decision making, indicated by triangle A in Figure 3b , without the cost of tightening the incentive constraint for any higher states.
A key questions we are interested in is what form delegation takes when a principal's ability to commit is limited. From our analysis above it follows that the optimal threshold delegation scheme can be implemented for any q b and not just as q ! 1. This is the case since, under threshold delegation, the principal never biases her decision by more than b and thus never faces a reneging temptation of more than b 2 . Thus, when G( ) is everywhere increasing, a principal with high commitment power q 0 b behaves in exactly the same way as a principal with very high commitment power q 00 > q 0 .
Proposition 3 has shown that in many cases threshold delegation is optimal. In the next proposition we show that when the conditions of that proposition are not satis…ed, it is often optimal for the principal to centralize, that is to implement the project y = E( ) that she expects to maximize her payo¤, given her prior.
PROPOSITION 4 (Centralization). Suppose that q b and that G( )
strictly decreasing in for all 2 . Then centralization is optimal.
A necessary condition for G( ) to be decreasing for all 2 is that f ( ) is everywhere decreasing. In this sense, the condition is satis…ed if bad states are more likely than better
states. This condition is satis…ed, for instance, for exponential distributions with su¢ ciently low means.
The formal proof of this proposition has two key parts. The …rst shows that if G( ) is strictly decreasing, then separation can never be optimal, that is it can never be optimal to induce the agent to reveal the true state. For a sketch of this part of the proof, consider two delegation sets which only di¤er in the projects they implement if lies in some interval [a 1 t; a 1 + t]. In particular, the …rst implements the agent's preferred project in this range, and therefore induces him to reveal the true state, while the second imple-
him to only reveal what interval the state lies in. The principal's expected payo¤ under the …rst scheme minus that under the second scheme is given by (a 1 ; t) as de…ned in (6) .
Equation (7) shows that (a 1 ; t) is concave in t if G( ) is everywhere decreasing. Since
Thus, the principal can improve on any delegation scheme that involves separation.
Having established this, the second part of the proof then shows that if G( ) is always decreasing, centralization dominates any menu delegation scheme that o¤ers two or more projects.
The proposition implies that in the absence of sophisticated monetary incentive schemes, it is often optimal for a principal to forgo the information that her agent possesses and to simply impose an uninformed decision. Essentially, when the principal is limited to delegation schemes, the cost of extracting information from the agent can be so high that the principal is better o¤ making an ignorant but unbiased decision than to try to bias decisions in favor of her subordinates to elicit more information. Business history and newspapers are abound with descriptions of monolithic …rms in which bureaucratic rules and regulations sti ‡e the creativity and ‡exibility of their employees. 6 The proposition suggests that such bureaucracy may simply be a symptom of the …rms'optimal responses to the agency problems they face.
We have seen above that when G( ) is everywhere increasing, a principal with limited ability to commit implements the same delegation scheme as a principal with unlimited commitment power. The same is true when G( ) is everywhere decreasing. This is so since the principal is always able to implement centralization, independent of the commitment power q that she possesses.
>From the two previous propositions it is clear that the key condition that determines the optimal delegation scheme when commitment power is high is whether G( ) is increasing or decreasing. To get a better sense for this condition and its implications we next consider an example. In particular, suppose that is drawn from a truncated exponential distribution with cumulative density
where > 0 is the scale parameter. An increase in causes a …rst order stochastic increase of the distribution and thus increases the mean E( ). Moreover, as ! 1; the distribution approaches the uniform distribution. It can be veri…ed that for this exponential distribution G( ) is everywhere increasing if b and it is everywhere decreasing otherwise. Thus, if the bias is smaller than the scale parameter, threshold delegation is optimal and if the bias is larger than the scale parameter, centralization is optimal, as illustrated in Figure 4 . To get some sense for the comparative statics, which we analyze more generally in Section 7, take a point above the diagonal in Figure 4 and consider the e¤ect of an increase in the bias. Initially, such an increase leads to a reduction of the threshold below which the principal rubberstamps the agent's recommendation. Eventually, b > and the principal centralizes, i.e. she simply implements E( ). At this point further increases in the bias do not a¤ect the optimal delegation scheme or the decision that is made. Similarly, take a point below the diagonal in Figure 4 and consider the e¤ect of an increase in . Such an increase moves probability mass from low-to high states, making it less and less costly for the principal to implement the agent's preferred project when his recommendation is small. When is su¢ ciently high, i.e. when b, it then becomes optimal for the principal to switch to threshold delegation and implement the agent's preferred projects for low states. Further increases in then simply increase the threshold up to the maximum value of a 1 = 1 2b.
While for any exponential-and many other distributions, G( ) is either everywhere increasing or decreasing, this is, of course, not always the case. For instance, for normal distributions with a su¢ ciently small variance, G( ) is …rst increasing and then decreasing. For such distributions we can use a similar proof strategy as described above by dividing the support of this distributions into intervals in which G( ) is monotonic. For an analysis of such distributions in the full commitment limit see Alonso and Matouschek (2005).
Low Commitment Power
In this subsection we characterize the solution to the contracting problem (3) -(5) when the principal's commitment power is low, i.e. q < b.
The key di¤erence between the high-and the low commitment power cases is that in the former the principal can credibly commit to decision rules that induce the agent to reveal the true states for some 0 while in the latter this is not possible. In other words, separation can be supported when q b but it cannot be supported when q < b. Together with the fact that optimal delegation schemes are monotonic, as established in Proposition 2, this implies that when commitment power is low, the optimal delegation scheme takes the form of menu delegation. We make this point formally in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 5 (Menu Delegation). Suppose that q < b. Then menu delegation is optimal.
Thus, when commitment power is low, the principal cannot do better than to let the agent choose between a …nite number of projects. Having established that for q < b menu delegation is optimal, the only remaining question is what projects the principal should put on the menu.
To address this question it is useful to restate the original contracting problem (3) -(5) as max N;y 1 ;:::;y N
subject to a 0 = 0, a N = 1, Just as in the case with high commitment power, the key trade-o¤ that the principal faces is between the extent to which decision making is biased in favor of the agent, given her information, and the amount of information that is communicated by the agent. To see this,
suppose that is uniformly distributed and recall that in the cheap talk benchmark in which q = 0, the intervals grow by 4b, as shown in (1). When q < b, then it follows from the incentive constraints (9) imply that
The lengths of the intervals therefore increase by 4b 2 y i+1 2 y i > 0 as i increases.
Thus, just as in the cheap talk benchmark, less information gets communicated by the agent, the larger his recommendation. The above expression, however, shows that when q > 0 the principal can reduce the loss of information by committing to bias her decision in favor of the agent, i.e. by setting y i > 0 for i = 1; :::; N 1. Intuitively, the agent is more willing to communicate information if the principal is committed to take his interests into account when making a decision. It is because of the improved communication that the principal may be willing to incur the direct cost of biasing her decisions in favor of the agent.
The solution to the above contracting problem again depends crucially on the distribution of and the bias b. It follows immediately from Proposition 4 that, when G(
is decreasing in , centralization is optimal. This is the case since, under centralization, the temptation to renege is equal to zero and can therefore be implemented for any level of commitment power q. This result is stated formally in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 6 (Centralization with Low Commitment Power). Suppose that q < b and that G( ) F ( ) + bf ( ) is decreasing for all 2 . Then centralization is optimal.
When G( ) is not everywhere decreasing, the optimal menu delegation scheme does depend on the level of commitment power q. To get a better understanding of how changes in q a¤ect the optimal menu delegation scheme in this case, the next proposition provides a characterization for an example in which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
PROPOSITION 7 (Uniform Example
ii. for all q > q, y 1 q; y i = q for i = 2; :::; N 1, and y N q.
Thus, when the principal has very little commitment power, i.e. when, the bene…t of additional information is so large that the gain of biasing decisions dominates the costs. As a result, it is optimal for her to bias her decision up to the maximum credible level. Note that in this case the number of intervals is maximized and that intervals grow by 4(b q), as can been from (11) . Thus, the amount of information that is being communicated is exactly the same as the one that would be communicated in the best Crawford and Sobel equilibrium of the static game when the agent has a bias of (b q). In terms of information transmission, therefore, commitment power is a perfect substitute for a reduction in the agent's bias.
When the amount of commitment power grows beyond the threshold q, it is still the case that the principal wants to extract more information by biasing all intermediate decisions y 2 ; :::y N 1 as much as possible. However, it can now be optimal to reduce y 1 and y N so as to economize on the cost of biased decision making. In fact, we know from Proposition 3 that when q = b, the bias of the last and largest interval is optimally set to zero. Thus, although the principal could extract as much information as in a static game with bias (b q), it is not always optimal for her to do so when q > q.
In summary, the analysis so far has shown that commonly observed organizational arrangements are often optimal in our basic model. Moreover, we have seen that exactly what arrangement is optimal depends crucially on two factors, namely the principal's commitment power and the interplay between the bias and the distribution of the state, as summarized in the simple condition G( ) = F ( ) + bf ( ). In particular, Table 1 , which summarizes some of the key results that we derived so far, shows that when G( ) is always increasing, threshold delegation is optimal when commitment power is high and menu delegation is optimal when commitment power is low while centralization is always optimal when G( ) is decreasing. Also, we have seen that in many cases changes in the commitment power do not a¤ect the optimal delegation scheme. In particular, when either G( ) is decreasing or G( ) is increasing and commitment power is high, increases in q have no e¤ect on the optimal delegation scheme.
Only when commitment power is small and G( ) is not everywhere decreasing can changes in q lead to changes in the optimal delegation scheme.
Delegation with Endogenous Commitment
So far we assumed that the agent is able to impose some exogenous cost q 2 on the principal whenever she reneges on a promise. This cost is meant to capture the damage that an agent can impose on the principal through unproductive behavior in a repeated relationship. In this section we endogenize this cost in an in…nitely repeated version of the above model. We characterize the relational contract that maximizes the principal's expected payo¤ and show that it is closely related to the optimal delegation schemes described above. In the next section we then describe additional implications of the model.
Consider then the following game. There are in…nitely many periods t = 1; 2; 3; ::: and in every period the principal and an agent play the same stage game. This stage game is identical to that described in Section 3 except that the agent is not able to impose an exogenous cost on the principal. The principal is in…nitely long lived and in every period she aims to maximize the present discounted value of her stage game payo¤s, where the discount rate is given by 2 [0; 1). At the beginning of every period t the principal is matched with a new agent who only interacts with her for one period. An agent who is matched with the principal in period t aims to maximize his stage game payo¤ U A (y t ; t ; b), where y t and t are, respectively, the project and the state in period t. Note that all the agents have the same payo¤ function and, in particular, the same bias b. We assume that the states t are i.i.d. over time and that they become publicly known at the end of each stage game. The history of the game up to date t is denoted by h t = ( 0 ; m 0 ; y 0 ; :::; t 1 ; m t 1 ; y t 1) , the null history is denoted by h 0 , and the set of all possible date t histories is denoted by H t .
A relational contract describes the behavior over time in the repeated game, both on the equilibrium path and following a deviation. Formally, a relational contract speci…es for any date t and any history h t 2 H t , (i.) a communication rule t ( t ) :
which assigns a probability distribution over M for any state t ; (ii.) a decision rule y t (m t ) : M H t ! R which assigns a project y t for every message m t ; (iii.) a belief function g t ( t j m t ) : M H t ! ( ) which assigns a probability distribution over the states t for every message m t . Note, in particular, that histories are public. The belief function g t is derived from t using Bayes'rule wherever possible.
A relational contact is self-enforcing if it describes a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. We focus on self-enforcing relational contracts with two properties. First, they are optimal, in the sense that they maximize the principal's expected present discounted payo¤. Second, the most severe punishment that can be implemented o¤ the equilibrium path calls for the agents and the principal to revert to the best static equilibrium ( CS ; y CS ; g CS ). In other words, in the punishment phase the principal and the agents play the strategies that maximize their expected stage game payo¤s. This assumption captures our belief that, when relational contracts break down, members of the same …rm are likely to coordinate on the equilibrium that maximizes their respective payo¤s in the absence of trust. 7 We discuss this assumption further at the end of this section.
We start the analysis of the repeated game by showing that the search for the optimal relational contract can be greatly simpli…ed by focusing on stationary contracts.
DEFINITION 5 (Stationarity). A relational contract is stationary if on-the-equilibrium path
t ( ) = ( ) and y t ( ) = y( ) for every date t, where ( ) is some communication rule and y( ) is some decision rule.
Under a stationary relational contract, each agent uses the same communication rule ( ) and in every period the principal uses the same decision rule y( ). We can now establish the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 8 (Stationarity).
There always exists an optimal relational contract that is stationary.
To characterize the optimal relational contract we therefore only need to characterize the 7 Baker, Gibbons, Murphy (1994) make a similar assumption for the same reason. 
The LHS of the reneging constraint is the principal's one period bene…t from making decision b y(m) arg max E [U P (y; ) j m] rather than decision y(m). The RHS is the maximum punishment that the agents can impose on the principal for reneging: by reverting to the best static equilibrium, the agents ensure that the principal's expected payo¤ in every postreneging period is E U CS P rather than E [U P (y ( ) ; )]. The expression on the RHS therefore corresponds to (the square of) the exogenously given commitment power q in the previous section.
We can use Propositions 3 to 7 to characterize the optimal relational delegation scheme (y (m; ); ( ; )). To see this, note that the only di¤erence between the static contacting problem (3) -(5) and the contracting problem in the repeated game (12) - (14) is the RHS of the reneging constraint: in the static problem the commitment power is exogenously given while it is endogenously determined in the repeated game problem. It then follows that the solution to the static problem is equivalent to that of the repeated game problem for an appropriately speci…ed discount rate. In particular, if (y (m; q) ; ( ; q)) are optimal for a given q, then the optimal relational delegation scheme is given by y m; 0 = y (m; q) and ; 0 = ( ; q), where 0 is the unique discount rate 2 [0; 1) that solves
We make this point formally in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 9 (Endogenous Commitment). Let (y (m; q) ; ( ; q)) be the optimal delegation scheme for a given q. The optimal relational delegation scheme is then given by ; 0 = ( ; q) and y m; 0 = y (m; q), where 0 solves (15) .
The insights of Propositions 3 to 7 can therefore be directly applied to the repeated game.
Thus, for instance, Propositions 4 and 6 imply that centralization is optimal for any discount rate if G( ) is always decreasing. If, instead, G( ) is always increasing then it follows from Propositions 3 and 5 that threshold delegation is optimal if the discount rate is su¢ ciently high and menu delegation is optimal otherwise.
To conclude this section it should be noted that our qualitative results do not depend on what assumption is made about the o¤-the-equilibrium path punishment. Above we have assumed that the worst punishment that can be imposed on the principal is to revert to the best static equilibrium. More severe punishments would merely reduce the principal's o¤-the-equilibrium path payo¤ and therefore increase the principal's commitment power for any discount rate. The only e¤ect of allowing for a more severe punishment would therefore be to lower the critical discount rate above which threshold can be implemented.
Implications
In this section we explore further implications of our analysis of optimal relational contracts.
Relational Delegation for Small Biases
In the previous sections we have seen that in many cases three commonly observed organizational arrangements are optimal. It turns out that for small biases only one organizational arrangement is optimal. Speci…cally, as the next proposition shows, threshold delegation is optimal for almost all common distributions when the bias is su¢ ciently small.
PROPOSITION 10 (Threshold Delegation for Small Biases).
Suppose that f ( ) is twice continuously di¤ erentiable. Then threshold delegation is optimal for su¢ ciently small biases.
Recall that when f ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable, G( ) is increasing for a su¢ ciently small bias b. To prove Proposition 10 we therefore only need to show that threshold delegation can be credibly implemented when b is small enough. To see that this is indeed the case, consider the reneging constraint
; where the LHS is the maximum reneging temptation under threshold delegation, the RHS is the punishment for reneging and U T D P is the principal's stage game payo¤ under the optimal threshold delegation scheme. Note that a reduction in the bias increases the payo¤ U CS P that the principal can realize in the absence of a relational contract. Thus, a reduction in the bias not only reduces the bene…t of reneging -the LHS of the inequality -but also, potentially, the punishment of doing so -the RHS. It is therefore not immediate that a reduction in the bias makes the reneging constraint less binding. In the formal proof we show, however, that when f ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, then, as b goes to zero, the bene…t of reneging goes to zero faster than the punishment. Thus, for su¢ ciently small b the reneging constraint is satis…ed and threshold delegation can be credibly implemented.
The E¤ects of Changes in the Bias and the Amount of Private Information Since threshold delegation and centralization play such prominent roles in our model we next investigate how they are a¤ected by changes in the economic environment.
Suppose …rst that threshold delegation is optimal and consider the maximization problem that determines the optimal threshold a 1 below which the principal implements the agents' preferred project and above which she implements her own preferred project:
The optimal threshold level then solves the necessary …rst order condition
Comparative statics can now be easily performed using the graphical representation of the …rst order condition in Figure 5 .
For instance, suppose that threshold delegation is optimal for a given b and consider the e¤ect of a reduction in the bias. Note that if G( ) is increasing for a given b then it is also increasing for any b 0 < b; thus threshold delegation remains optimal after the reduction in the bias. It can be seen in Figure 5 that a reduction in b shifts down (a 1 + b) but does not a¤ect E( j a 1 ). Thus, a reduction in the bias increases the optimal threshold, i.e. it leads to more delegation. This result is in line with Jensen and Meckling (1992) who argue that a reduction in agency costs should generally lead to more delegation.
Suppose next that threshold delegation is optimal for a given distribution and consider the e¤ect of an increase in the amount of private information, as formalized by a mean preserving spread of the distribution. At …rst glance one may think that such a change makes the agents' information 'more important'and should thus lead to more delegation. In our model, however, there are two reasons why this is not necessarily the case. First, a mean preserving spread can a¤ect the sign of G 0 ( ). Thus, it is quite possible that after an increase in the amount of private information threshold delegation is no longer optimal. Second, even if G( ) is still increasing after the mean preserving spread, it has an ambiguous e¤ect on the optimal threshold a 1 .
To see this, consider Figure 5 and note that while a mean preserving spread does not a¤ect
, it has an ambiguous e¤ect on conditional mean E( j a 1 ). Thus, in our model, a change in the amount of private information can lead to more or less delegation, depending on the exact parameter values and distributional assumptions.
Finally, consider the e¤ects of changes in the economic environment on centralization.
Suppose that centralization is optimal for a given bias b 0 and consider the e¤ect an increase in the bias to b 00 > b 0 . If G( ) is everywhere decreasing for b 0 then it is also everywhere decreasing for b 00 > b 0 . Thus, after the increase in the bias centralization is still optimal. Moreover, since an increase in the bias does not a¤ect E( ), the principal implements the same decision after the increase in b as she did before the increase. While the e¤ect of an increase in the bias on centralization is unambiguous, the e¤ect of an increase in the amount of private information is less clear-cut. This is again the case since a mean preserving spread can change the sign of G( ) so that centralization may no longer be optimal after the increase in the amount of private information. If it does not change the sign of G( ) an increase in the amount of private information does not a¤ect the optimal delegation scheme and the decision that is implemented by the principal remains E( ).
Threshold Delegation and Investment Ine¢ ciencies Whenever the principal chooses threshold delegation, she optimally induces overinvestment in low states and underinvestment in high states.
COROLLARY 1 (Investment Ine¢ ciencies).
Under the conditions in Proposition 3, it is optimal for the principal to induce underinvestment if E( j a 1 ) and to induce overinvestment otherwise.
To see this, consider Figure 1 which gives an example of a threshold delegation scheme.
From the principal's perspective, the e¢ cient investment level in state is simply . In Figure   1 , however, it can be seen that this e¢ cient investment level is almost never achieved. Instead, it is optimal for the principal to induce investments that are larger than when the states are low, i.e. below E( j a 1 ), and to induce investments that are smaller than when states are high. In other words, given the informational asymmetry, the principal cannot do better than to allow the agents to spend too much on small projects and too little on large projects.
Complete Delegation and Outsourcing An organizational arrangement that has received a lot of attention in the literature (see in particular Dessein 2002) and is notably absent from our discussion up to this point is complete delegation, as de…ned next.
DEFINITION 6 (Complete Delegation).
Under complete delegation the principal always rubberstamps the agent's recommendation.
Faced with this decision rule, an agent always recommends his preferred project.
PROPOSITION 11 (Complete Delegation). Complete delegation is never optimal.
To see this, suppose that the principal does engage in complete delegation, as illustrated in Figure 3a . Note that to do so she must be able to resist a maximum reneging temptation of b 2 . When she has enough commitment power to implement complete delegation, however, she also has enough commitment power to implement an alternative scheme in which she rubberstamps the agents'proposals when they are small and implements a threshold project when they are large. As can be seen from Figure 3b such a scheme increases the principal's expected payo¤ but does not increase the maximum reneging temptation, which remains to be b 2 . Thus, whenever complete delegation is feasible, it is not payo¤ maximizing for the principal.
So far we have ruled out the possibility of outsourcing, by which we mean the transfer of formal authority to the agents. If the principal could outsource, then agents would always choose their preferred project. Thus, outsourcing implements the same decision rule as complete delegation. In contrast to complete delegation, however, it does not require any commitment power by the principal. We have seen above that when commitment power is high, the principal can implement complete delegation but does not …nd it optimal to do so.
It is then immediate that outsourcing cannot be optimal for a principal with high commitment power. However, a principal with low commitment power cannot implement complete delegation and may …nd it optimal to outsource since doing so allows her to credibly commit to having the agents' preferred projects being implemented. That this is indeed the case is shown in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 12 (Outsourcing).
There exists a critical level of commitment power q 0 < b such that outsourcing does better than relational delegation only if q < q 0 .
This proposition reinforces an important result in Dessein (2002) . He considers a static game that is very similar to our basic model and compares outsourcing to 'communication,'
i.e. the best equilibrium without any commitment. 8 The key result in his paper is that, in a static setting, the principal is often better o¤ outsourcing than relying on communication. The above proposition shows that outsourcing does not only dominate communication when the principal's commitment power is equal to zero but also for strictly positive, albeit su¢ ciently low, levels of commitment power.
Empirical Implications Our model is quite stylized and abstracts from many factors that are likely to in ‡uence delegation schemes in the real world. Nevertheless, the model does o¤er a number of predictions that di¤erentiate it from other models of delegation and that are, in principle, testable. Below we provide a short list of our main empirical implications, focusing on two of the three choice variables in our model -the type of delegation schemes that is being used and the projects that get implemented. We do not discuss the third choice variable -the information that is transmitted -since in most contexts it cannot be observed.
In discussing empirical implications we concentrate on capital budgeting rules since this is an area in which both delegation schemes and project choices are often observable. The main empirical implications are the following:
A variety of delegation schemes such as, for instance, centralization and threshold delegation should be observed. Complete delegation, however, should never be observed. 9 A larger variety of delegation schemes should be observed in …rms in which agency problems are severe than in …rms in which they are limited. In the latter case threshold delegation should be pervasive.
Firms that operate in booming markets, i.e. in markets in which good states are more likely than bad states, should engage in more threshold delegation and less centralized decision making than …rms that operate in depressed markets, i.e. in markets in which bad states are more likely than good states.
The size distribution of investments should by 'lumpier' in …rms with severe agency problems than in …rms in which they are limited. In other words, investments of many di¤erent sizes should be observed in …rms in which agency problems are small whereas investments of a limited number of di¤erent sizes should be observed in …rms in which agency problems are large.
The size distribution of investments should by lumpier in …rms in which the top management has a low discount factor -for instance because the …rm operates in an industry with high exit rates or is characterized by high labor turnover of top managers -than in …rms in which top management in which a high discount factor.
The size distribution of investments should be lumpier in …rms that operate in booming markets than in …rms that operate in depressed markets.
All these implications follow immediately from the results derived above, we therefore do not provide proofs for them.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the allocation of decision rights within …rms. In particular, we analyzed a principal-agent problem in which an uninformed principal can elicit information from an informed agent by implicitly committing herself to act on the information she receives in a particular manner. We showed that commonly observed organizational arrangements arise optimally in this setting. Speci…cally, we showed that centralization, threshold delegation and menu delegation are often optimal. Which one of these organizational arrangements is optimal depends only on the principal's commitment power, on the one hand, and a simple condition on the agents'bias and the distribution of the state space, on the other. Moreover, we showed that for small biases threshold delegation is optimal for almost all common distributions. Finally, we showed that complete delegation is never optimal and that outsourcing can only be optimal if the principal is su¢ ciently impatient.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in at least two directions. First, to take a step towards investigating delegation in a setting with imperfect commitment power, we have focused on the principal's commitment problem and have abstracted from that of agents. We believe that it would be interesting to investigate delegation when either only the agents or the agents and the principal have some commitment power. Second, in the repeated game we have assumed that the state is publicly observed at the end of each period. This assumption ensures that histories are public and thereby facilitates the analysis. Relaxing this assumption would surely be interesting and would shed more light on the internal organization of …rms.
We leave the investigation of these issues for future research.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of all Propositions in the paper.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1: Follows from Theorem 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
The proof of Proposition 2 will follow from the following two lemmas. The …rst lemma establishes the existence of an optimal stationary relational contract for any discount factor 2 [0; 1).
LEMMA 1 For any optimal relational contract there is a stationary optimal relational contract.
Proof: Consider an optimal relational contract (H t ; t ( ); y t ( )), t 2 f0; 1; :::g and let V P (h t ) = P 1 =t t E [U P (y ( ( ; h )); )] be the principal's expected discounted utility at time t after history h t with 
Now consider a stationary contract (H t ; 0 t ( ); y 0 t ( )), t 2 f0; 1; :::g where along the equilibrium path 0 t ( ) = 0 ( ); y 0 t ( ) = y 0 ( ). Since on and o¤ the equilibrium path the principal obtains the same continuation utility this new contract is subgame perfect.
The next lemma establishes monotonicity of the optimal relational contract.
LEMMA 2 (Melumad and Shibano 1991) An incentive compatible y( ( )) must satisfy the following: (i.) y( ( )) is weakly increasing, (ii.) If y( ( )) is strictly increasing and continuous in ( 1 ; 2 ), then y( ( )) = + b on ( 1 ; 2 ), (iii.) if y( ( )) is discontinuous at b , then the discontinuity must be a jump discontinuity that satis…es: (a.)
This lemma corresponds to Proposition 1 in Melumad and Shibano (1991) and we refer to their proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
For the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 it is useful to introduce some new notation. In particular,
It is also useful to introduce two lemmas. To do so, let
where ( with p = + =2 + b and t = =2 .
Proof: We …rst note that,
and Proof: (i.) Since G( ) is strictly decreasing we have that 1
Integrating both sides between a 1 and 1 yields the inequality
(ii.) Recall the de…nition of S( ) and note that dS( )=d = 1 G( ) for 2 (0; 1). Thus, 
Proof of Proposition 3
To establish Proposition 3 we need to introduce two more lemmas.
LEMMA 5. Suppose that G( ) is strictly increasing in [0; 1]. Then if y( ) and ( ) is an optimal delegation scheme there cannot be two consecutive pooling regions, i.e. there cannot be two intervals [ i ; i+1 ] and [ i+1 ; i+2 ] with 0 i < i+1 < i+2 1 such that y( ( )) = y i for all 2 ( i ; i+1 ) and y( ( )) = y i+1 (6 = y i ) for all 2 ( i+1 ; i+2 ). 
Let a (y i + y i+1 ) =2 b. Then the increment in the principal's expected payo¤ of switching
Note that
Using T ( ) as de…ned at the beginning of this section, the above inequality can then be rewritten as
T ( ) is strictly convex which in turn implies that T (2a) > 2T (a). This establishes that > 0.
Thus, (y( ); ( )) cannot be optimal.
CASE III: Suppose y i+1 > 1 + b; b < y i < 1 + b. In this case if both y i and y i+1 are to be induced with positive probability it must be that (y i + y i+1 ) =2 < 1 + b. 
Noting that
we can express the increment as
>From a < c < and Lemma 4 (ii.) we have that S(a) < 0, which implies that the …rst term on the RHS of (16) Proof: From the previous lemma the optimal delegation scheme is characterized by two threshold levels ; with (a.)
if 0 < < < 1, and (b.) y( ( )) constant over [0; 1] if = . The expected utility of the principal is given by
Optimality of y( ) and ( ) requires that and satisfy the …rst order necessary conditions 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Follows from Lemmas 3-6.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 is carried out through a sequence of lemmas that gradually reduce the class of potential optimal delegation schemes when G( ) is strictly decreasing in [0; 1]. 
Suppose that y 2 (y 1 +y 3 )=2 (the analysis if y 2 (y 1 +y 3 )=2 would follow the same argument).
Letting r = (
Making use of T ( ) as de…ned above, we obtain
If we express s = (y 2 + y 3 ) =2 b as a convex combination of r and t; s = r + (1 )t, and noting that y 3 y 2 = (1 )(y 3 y 1 ) and y 2 y 1 = (y 3 y 1 ); we can write U in the more
Since G( ) is strictly decreasing, T ( ) is strictly concave and hence U > 0. This establishes that the original delegation scheme (y( ); ( )) where more than two projects are implemented cannot be optimal.
ii.) Suppose that D A does not contain three consecutive projects. From Lemma 2 y( ( ))
is weakly increasing and therefore continuous except in a countable set of points f i g ; i 2 N. 10 We will now introduce some notation pertinent to this part of the proof. ; y i+1 . We note that this scheme fully identi…es y i ( i ( )) except possibly at its points of discontinuity. For completeness we de…ne y i ( ); i ( ) such that y i ( i ( )) is left continuous at its points of discontinuity.
Since G( ) is strictly decreasing, the analysis of the case with three consecutive projects establishes that E [U P (y i ( i ( )); )] > E U P (y i+1 ( i+1 ( )); ) . Next we show that E [U P (y i ( i ( )); )] Proof: Let y( ( )) 2 fy 1 ; y 2 g be an optimal two-project equilibrium with y 1 < y 2 . Since both projects are selected with positive probability there must exist a state a 1 , with 0 < a 1 < 1, at which the agent is indi¤erent between y 1 and y 2 , i.e. (y 1 + y 2 ) =2 = a 1 + b.
Since, for …xed a 1 ; the projects fy 1 ; y 2 g are optimal they must satisfy the …rst order condition 
Using Lemma 4 (i.) we have that S(a 1 ) > 0 for 0 a 1 < 1, and, in particular, S(0) = b E [ ] > 0 . Since y 2 > b the …rst term in (18) is positive and the second term is zero from the …rst order condition (17) implying that U > 0. Thus any two-project optimal delegation scheme is dominated by centralization.
Proof of Proposition 4: Follows from Lemmas 3,4 and 7-9.
Proofs of Propositions 5-10
Proof of Proposition 5: Follows from the discussion in the text.
Proof of Proposition 6: Follows from Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7:
We …rst show that for given N , the solution to (8) subject to (9) and (10) If y j < q for any j 2 f2; :::; N 1g, then, from the above two equations, dE [U P ] =dy j > 0.
Since an increase in y j relaxes all the other reneging constraints it follows that y j < q cannot be a solution. Thus, the solution must satisfy y i = q for i = 2; :::; N 1.
We can now prove part (i.) of the proposition. We …rst prove that if q b=4, then y i = q Note that the third term on the RHS is positive and that (y 2 y 1 ) > a 1 . Thus, q b=2 is a su¢ cient condition for y 1 = q.
Suppose that q b=2 and y 1 = q. We now know that for given N , the solution satis…es y i = q for i = 1; :::; N if. We next argue that the optimal number of intervals is given by the maximum number of intervals e N that can be supported in equilibrium. We do so in two steps. First, we show that e N is increasing in y i . Second, we show that if y i = q for i = 1; :::; N , then E [U P ] is increasing in N .
>From ( 
In any equilibrium the intervals must add up to one, i.e. a 1 + P N i=2 (a i a i 1 ) = 1. Since it must be that a 1 0, e N is given by the largest integer for which P N i=2 (a i a i 1 ) 1. From (19) it then follows that e N is increasing in y i for i = 1; :::; N . The expression on the RHS is increasing in N for all N e N . This proves part (i.).
For part (ii.) note that from the above y i = q for i = 2; :::; N 1 for any q < b. 
Proof of Proposition

